第104章

Malebranche quotes from Augustine “that we see God even from the time we first enter upon this life (dès cette vie)， through the knowledge that we have of eternal truths. The truth is uncreated， unchangeable， immeasurable， eternal above all things； it is true through itself， and has its perfection from no thing. It makes the creator more perfect， and all spirits naturally seek to know it： now there is nothing that has these perfections but God， and thus the truth is God. We perceive these unchangeable and eternal truths， hence we see God.” “God indeed sees but He does not feel sensuous things. If we see something sensuous， sensation and pure thought are to be found in our consciousness. Sensation is a modification of our spirit； God occasions this because He knows that our soul is capable of it. The Idea which is bound up with the sensation is in God； we see it， etc. This relation， this union of our mind and spirit with the Word (Verbe) of God， and of our will with His love， is that we are formed after the image of God and in His likeness."(4) Thus the love of God consists in relating one’ s affections to the Idea of God； whoever knows himself and thinks his affections clearly， loves God. We further find sundry empty litanies concerning God， a catechism for children of eight years of age respecting goodness， justice， omnipresence， the moral order of the world； in all their lifetime theologians do not get any further.

We have given the principal of Malebranche’ s ideas； the remainder of his philosophy is composed partly of formal logic， and partly of empirical psychology. He passes to the treatment of errors， how they arise， how the senses， the imagination， the understanding， deceive us， and how we must conduct ourselves in order to effect a remedy. Then Malebranche goes on (T. III. L. VI.

P. I. chap. i. pp. 1-3) to the rules and laws for recognizing the truth. Thus here the term Philosophy was even applied to the manner in which reflections on particular objects are drawn from formal logic and external facts.

1. Buhle： Gesch. d. neuern Philosophie， Vol. III. Sec. 2， pp. 430， 431.

2. Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité (Paris， 1736)， T. II. L. III. Part I. chap. i. pp. 4-6；T. I. L. I. chap. i. pp. 6， 7； P. II chap. ii. pp. 66-68； chap. iii. p. 72； chap. iv. p. 84； chap. v. p.

92； chap. vi. pp. 95， 96.

3. Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité， T. II. L. III. Part II. chap. vi. pp. 100-102.

4. Malebranche： De la recherche de la vérité， T. II. L. III. P. II. chap. vi. pp. 103-107， 109-111.

Section Two： Period of the Thinking Understanding Chapter I. - The Metaphysics of the Understanding B 1. LOCKE.

When experience means that the Notion has objective actuality for consciousness， it is indeed a necessary element in the totality； but as this reflection appears in Locke， signifying as it does that we obtain truth by abstraction from experience and sensuous perception， it is utterly false， since， instead of being a moment， it is made the essence of the truth. It is no doubt true that against the hypothesis of the inward immediacy of the Idea， and against the method of setting it forth in definitions and axioms， as also against absolute substance， the demand that ideas should be represented as results， and the claims of individuality and self-consciousness， assert their rights to recognition. In the philosophy of Locke and Leibnitz， however， these necessities make themselves known in an imperfect manner only； the one fact which is common to both philosophers is that they， in opposition to Spinoza and Malebranche， take for their principle the particular， finite determinateness and the individual. According to Spinoza and Malebranche substance or the universal is the true， the sole existent， the eternal， that which is in and for itself， without origin， and of which particular things are only modifications which are conceived through substance. But hereby Spinoza has done an injury to this negative； he hence arrived at no immanent determination， for all that is determined and individual is merely annihilated in his system. Now， on the contrary， the general inclination of consciousness is to maintain the difference， partly in order to， mark itself out as implicitly free in opposition to its object - Being， nature， and God， and partly in order to recognize the unity in this opposition， and from the opposition itself to make the unity emerge. But those who were the instruments of this tendency comprehended themselves but little， they had still no clear consciousness of their task， nor of the manner in which their claims could be satisfied.

With Locke， this principle makes its first entrance into Philosophy in a manner so completely at variance with the inflexible undifferentiated identity of the substance of Spinoza， that the sensuous and limited， the immediate present and existent， is the main and fundamental matter. Locke does not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness， viz. that objects outside of us are the real and the true. The finite is thus not grasped by Locke as absolute negativity， i.e.， in its infinitude； this we shall not find until we come to deal in the third place with Leibnitz. It is in a higher sense that Leibnitz asserts individuality， the differentiated， to be self-existent and indeed objectless， to be true Being. That is to say， it is not according to him finite， but is yet distinguished；thus， each monad is itself the totality. Leibnitz and Locke hence likewise stand in a position of mutual independence and antagonism.